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NOTES
Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule I0b-5 and the Federal
Securities Code
The nation's largest railroad reached the end of the line on June
21, 1970. On that date the Penn Central Transportation Company
filed a petition for reorganization pursuant to section 77 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act.1 The collapse of the company caught many
shareholders by surprise. Although the Penn Central Company on
occasion had modified its corporate form,2 it had not missed paying
a dividend for 123 years,3 and its securities sported prime ratings
until the month before the bankruptcy.4
Yet, not everyone was injured in the crash. The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) report to Congress on the collapse of the
Penn Central alleges that some corporate insiders dumped their personal holdings of Penn Central securities shortly before news of the
company's financial distress reached the investing public.ti It was also
alleged that insiders made these sales without disclosing material information regarding the company's approaching crisis, and that
Penn Central's management issued unjustifiably optimistic reports
to the public.6 It is not surprising that the "·wreck of the Penn
Central" has generated considerable private litigation by shareI. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). See Wall St. J., June 22, 1970, at 3, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
The bankruptcy of the Penn Central as well as the collapse of the Reading, Eric
Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Central of New Jersey, Boston &: Maine, and Ann Arbor
railroads prompted Congress to enact the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-93 (Supp. 1974)). The
Act envisions the reorganization of bankrupt lines into a unified and profitable system
serving the northeastern and midwestern United States.
2. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1030·31 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
In 1968 the Pennsylvania Railroad Company merged with the New York Central Railroad, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1968, at 1, col. 8 Qate city ed.), and in 1969 a reorganiza•
tion plan was consummated that created the Penn Central Transportation Company as
a subsidiary (and main asset) of the Penn Central Holding Company. See J. DAUGHEN
&: P. B1NZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL, facing P· 113 (1971).
3. Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1969, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.).
4. See McClintock, The Credit Checkers, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1970, at 1, 16, cols. 6, 4
(eastern ed.).
5. STAFF R.EPoRT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Co1,rMISSION TO THE SPECIAL sun.
COMM. ON lNvEsnGATIONS, 92D CONG., 2D SES.S., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN
CENTRAL COMPANY 245-60 (Subcomm. Print 1972).
6. Id. at 243: "Between the tim:e of the formation of the Penn Central Transporta•
tion Company in February 1968 and the June 1970 bankruptcy, as management de•
libcrately and increasingly glazed its public reports with distorted optimism, many
members of management succeeded in selling many shares of Penn Central stock."
See also In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
modified, 357 F. Supp. 869 (1973), af!d., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
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holders7 to hold the insiders liable under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,8 as implemented by rule lOb-5.9
The Penn Central litigation, involving a large, publicly held
corporation, illustrates the need to examine th·e reach of the federal
antifraud provisions. This Note discusses the problem of defining
the plaintiff class when the number of past and present shareholders
who are potential plaintiffs is very great. Attention will center on
the methods courts have used to limit the class of investors compensable under rule I0b-5. Also, the effect that enactment of present
drafts of the American Law lnstitute's proposed Federal Securities
Code10 would have on the composition of the plaintiff class in
7. The private fraud actions against Penn Central officers and directors have been
consolidated for trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (M.DL. Docket No. 56).
See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified,
357 F. Supp. 869 (1973), afjd., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). The quoted phrase was
borrowed from the title of a very readable book describing the events leading to the
railroad's demise. See J. DAUGHEN & P. BINZEN, supra note 2.
The SEC has also filed criminal charges against Penn Central Company and its
former top officials, alleging that they directed a massive scheme of fraud prior to the
bankruptcy filing of the railroad subsidiary in 1970. SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.11 94,527 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1974). See also Wall
St. J., May 3, 1974, at 3, col. 1 (midwestem ed.); Washington Post, May 3, 1974, § A,
at 1, col. 7.
8. 15 u.s.c. § 78j (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange •.• (b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
9. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
10. The idea for a new codification of the federal securities laws originated with
the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. See Hershman, An OverviewRegulation of Securities and the Securities Markets: A Timely Report to the Bar, 28
Bus. LAw. 375 (1973). The American Law Institute accepted the challenge and selected
Louis Loss as reporter. Thus far, three tentative drafts have been published. ALI
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 1972) deals with exemptions, issuer
registrations, distributions, postregistration provisions, and definitions relating to these
areas. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973), the draft relevant
to this Note, predominantly covers deceptive and manipulative acts and civil liabilities
therefor. ALI FEDERAL SECURlTIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, April 1974) also deals with
exemptions and distributions, as well as the administration, enforcement, and scope
of the Code. For some of the history behind the codification effort see Loss, The Amer-
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analogous actions will be discussed. Finally, the Note assesses the
viability of the private compensatory remedy in light of the di£. :ficulties that plague the limitation of the plaintiff class in rule
IOb-5 actions.11
ican Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969), in ALI FED·
ERAL SECURITIES CODE at xxix (I'ent. Draft No. 1, April 1972),
While it is unprofitable at present to speculate whether and in what form the Code
will be adopted, it will undoubtedly elicit much discussion from lawyers, legal scholars,
and judges. It may have considerable influence on the courts as authority even wl1ile
it still is being formulated. For example, the Code's definition of "knowledge" is
relied on in Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F,2d 115, 123 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973).
11. For the sake of clarity this Note will assume that the defendant bas violated
rule l0b-5. It should be recognized, however, that the harshness of the private damage
remedy is exacerbated by uncertainty concerning the elements of a violation. For ex•
ample, it is not clear whether the defendant must have had knowledge of the false
representation or misleading nondisclosure to be held liable. See 2 A. BROMDERG,
SEcurunES LAws §§ 8.4(500)-(690) (Supp. 1971); Epstein, Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C. L. REv. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a
Continuum of Conduct To Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1206 (1970), Some circuits state that knowledge is not necessary and
that negligence suffices. See cases collected in R. JENNINGS &: H. MARsH, SECURITIF.S
REGULATION: CAsES AND MATERIALS 1071 nn.7, 8 (3d ed. 1972). Under the latter standard,
it might seem easy for a defendant to stumble into a rule l0b-5 violation, but one
commentary is skeptical of the seriousness of the risk. It questions whether "any court
would in fact impose a crushing liability upon a corporate officer in favor of thousands
of purchasers in the market for simple negligence in the issuance of a press release."
Id. at 1072. The Second Circuit would not, finding negligence sufficient to support an
injunction under rule l0b-5 but requiring scienter in a damage action. Shemtob v.
Shearson, Hammill &: Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit has
repeatedly affirmed its stand against the sufficiency of mere negligence. See, e.g., Chris•
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel &: Co., 479 F,2d 1277, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1973);
Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 n.15 (2d Cir. 1972),
Second Circuit decisions have recently influenced district courts in other circuits to
come out against a negligence standard. See, e.g., Waldman v. Shearson, Hammill &: Co.,
Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,396 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 1974);
Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1973); Golob v. Nauman Vandervoort,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ohio 1972). In the recent case of Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit appears to have agreed
with the Second Circuit that mere negligence is not sufficient. The Smallwood court
held that although it would not "draw the bottom line on the degree of scienter required" in the circuit, some culpability beyond mere negligence is necessary. 489 F.2d
at 606. Citing "the difficulties courts have had in trying to fit a wide variety of complex fact situations and relationships within a single standard of scienter,"· the Ninth
Circuit has recently rejected any comprehensive scienter test. White v. Abrams, [19731974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,457, at 95,608 (9th Cir. March 15,
1974). Instead the court of appeals proposes to determine the duty that rule lOb-5
imposes on a particular defendant by looking at such factors as the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant's access to information compared
to the plaintiff's access, the defendant's benefit from the relationship, the defendant's
awareness of the plaintiff's reliance, and the defendant's activity in initiating the
securities transaction. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,i 94,457, at 95,609-10. Perhaps the Ninth
Circuit would not feel compelled to depart from more traditional state of mind
standards if the Code's method of varying the standard with the type of violation, see
note 29 infra, were substituted for the single standard used now.
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Under present law, the possible reach of section lO(b) and rule
lOb-5 is extensive. The rule imposes on corporate insiders not only
the duty to make no affirmative misrepresentations "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security," but also the duty to "disclose
material facts which are known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment." 12 Courts
have left intact the broad sweep of this language. In the leading case
of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,13 for example, it was held that
anyone who has access to inside corporate information that a reasonable investor would consider important in making an investment
decision may not trade in the securities of that corporation without
disclosing the information to the investing public.14
Congress has created an impressive array of sanctions against violators of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5, many of which are enforced
by the SEC.15 For insiders of a large corporation, however, the most
Another troubling problem under present law is the requirement that the information undisclosed or misrepresented by the defendant be "material." Courts have been
unable to articulate a clear definition of "materiality." In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), for instance, the
Second Circuit approved two different formulations, one covering " 'those situations
which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to have
a substantial effect on the market price of the security if [the extraordinary situation
is] disclosed,' " 401 F.2d at 848, quoting Fleisher, Securities Trading and Corporate
Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51
VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965), and the other, less strict, encompassing all facts "'which
in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's
stock or securities ..• .'" 401 F.2d at 849, quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)
(emphasis added by Texas Gulf Sulphur court). Either definition could conceivably
cover educated guesses based on the sort of specialized knowledge inevitably acquired
by an insider, a result deplored by at least one federal district judge. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Bonsal, J.), a/fd. in part and
reud. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
12, Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). In this case the SEC made clear
for the first time that a violation of rule l0b-5 could arise from nondisclosure of
material facts, without an express misrepresentation, in a non-face-to-face transaction
on a securities market. 40 S.E.C. at 914. See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules,
50 CALIF. L. REv. 408, 415-16 (1962). The traditional rule had been that the affirmative
duty of disclosure applied only in face-to-face transactions. See Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Reasoning from traditional fiduciary concepts, one
common law case expanded the affirmative disclosure duty to include a director's
open market purchase of stock from an existing shareholder. Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136
Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). However, a distinction between purchases from existing
shareholders and sales to nonshareholders was expressly rejected in Cady. 40 S.E.C.
at 913.
13. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
14. Trading may not even be required. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
For a general discussion of the liability of nontrading participants in rule l0b-5
violations see 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, §§ 8.5(500-98) (Supp. 1970).
15. Congress has expressly empowered the SEC to conduct investigations of possible
past or potential violations and to publish information concerning such violations.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)-(c) (1970). Some skepticism has been voiced regarding the efficacy of
this sanction. See, e.g., Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REv.,
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fearsome sanction is the private damage remedy implied by the
courts under rule IOb-5. 16 The number of possible plaintiffs is large,
and the extent of their loss is potentially as great as the number of
outstanding shares multiplied by the drop in price. Penn Central
Company, for example, had 24,110,321 shares of common stock outstanding as of December 31, 1971;17 during the period from 1968 to
1970, the price of its stock fell from 86 l /2 per share to 5 1/2 per
share.18 Those investors who bought or held Penn Central stock in
ignorance of the company's financial weakness thus suffered an immense aggregate loss, grossly disproportionate to the savings made by
insiders who sold their holdings before news of the bankruptcy
reached the public. To require those insiders to reimburse all shareholders for their losses would be unduly harsh, and would also be
impossible to effect. If no limitations on the plaintiff class are imposed, those who profit will lack the necessary funds to pay those
injured. The result would not be reimbursement but personal
bankruptcy.
The proposed Federal Securities Code generally achieves a more
reasonable result because in many situations it imposes a ceiling on
the possible extent of the defendant's liability.19 In accord with its
objective of rectifying the overlap and "scatteration" of the present
July-Aug. 1961, at I, 6 (indicating that the business community does not seriously con•
demn insider trading). However, Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny may have pro•
duced a less cynical attitude among corporate officials. A new study might be fruitful,
The SEC can tum over information gathered through investigations to the attorney
general for use in criminal prosecutions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). The Securities and
E."'l:change Act provides for fines of up to 10,000 dollars and imprisonment for up to
two years for willful violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
In addition, the SEC may obtain injunctions barring further violations. 15 U,S.C,
§ 78u(e) (1970). And in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), the court acknowledged the Commission's authority to
seek restitutionary relief to deprive insiders of the fruits of their wrongdoing. 446 F,2d
at 1307-08. No specific statutory authority exists for such relief, but the court upheld
the authority of a district court to grant restitution as an ancillary remedy in the
exercise of its general equity powers. 446 F.2d at 1307. The court stipulated that the
SEC might seek "other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of
the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and not a penalty assessment." 446 F,2d
at 1308.
16. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E,D,
Pa. 1946). Other cases are collected in 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871•'13 (2d
ed. Supp. 1969); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legis/a.
tive Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L REv. 627, 687-90 (1960). It has been suggested that the private
cause of action implied under rule lOb-5 should extend only to suits brought by
sellers, but the idea has won little acceptance. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note II, § 2.4(2)
(Supp. 1971).
,
17. MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL 568 (1972),
18. Id.
19. See text following note 44 infra and text accompanying notes 161-62 infra.
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statutes,20 the Code breaks down and delineates antifraud violations
that are now covered in a broad manner by section IO(b) and rule
IOb-5, as well as by other provisions and rules. 21 Part XIII (sections
1301 to 1311) groups all of the provisions that prohibt acts of
fraud, misrepresentation, or manipulation. Section 130l(a), a principal counterpart to the present section IO(b), makes it unlawful to
engage in fraudulent securities transactions, proxy solicitations, or
tender requests. Section 1303(a) prohibits trading by insiders if they
know a "fact of special significance" that is not generally available.
The practice of fraud in connection ·with filings, records, and publicity is outlawed by section 1304. Other provisions less similar to
present actions under rule lOb-5 make it illegal to give fraudulent
investment advice (section 1302); to misrepresent Commission approval (section 1305); or to engage in churning (section 1306),22
touting (section 1307),23 manipulation (section 1308),24 or stabilization (section 1309).2 5
20. See ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum at xv-xvi (Tent.
Draft No. 2, March 1973), which lists the principal problems with the present statutes.
21. However, the Code is not intended completely to supersede the growth of the
common law in the rule lOb-5 area. Reporter Louis Loss early in the project indicated
that he would not "codify the law in that area completely" because in a time of rapid
development of a federal corporation law it might not be prudent "to foreclose judicial
invention of private rights of action" by making "everything express." Loss, supra note
10, at 34.
22. Churning occurs when a broker who has been granted discretion by a client to
trade on his account abuses that discretion by engaging in transactions that are excessive or overfrequent in light of the nature of the account. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH,
supra note 11, at 837-38. The Code section on churning would also cover abuses by
brokers who have authority for excessive trading in a client's account by reason of
the client's willingness to follow the broker's suggestions.
23. This Code provision covers the situation in which a person describes or
recommends a security to a second person for consideration from a third person, such
as an issuer or broker, who is interested in buying or selling the stock. The first
person must disclose the source of consideration. Thus, A cannot receive money from ·
B in consideration for desa·ibing B's stock to C unless C knows or is told that A is
being paid by B. This provision is a recodification (with minor changes) of section
17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1970).
24. Manipulation can take a number of forms under the Code. Manipulation by
touting is defined in section 1308(a) as the dissemination by a buyer or seller, or prospective buyer or seller, of a security of "information to the effect that the price of a
security of the ••. issuer ... will or is likely to rise or fall because of the market
operations of any person conducted for the purpose of raising or depressing the price
of the first security." This provision is derived from sections 9{a)(3) and 9(a)(5) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(3), (5) (1970). See R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, supra note 11, at 924-25.
Wash sales and matched orders-phony or offsetting sales made to give the appearance of active trading in securities-are prohibited in section 1308(b), and section 1308(c) prohibits manipulation by trading.
25. Stabilization, under both present law and under the Code, is a transaction designed to fix or peg the price of a security. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note
11, at 869-924.
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Part XIV (sections 1401 to 1424) establishes civil liabilities for the
violation of the provisions of part XIII. Section 1402 provides a private remedy for buyers and sellers victimized by deceptive sales or
purchases in violation of sections 130l(a)(l) or 1303(a). Buyers and
sellers injured by false publicity prohibited by section 1304(c) have a
remedy in section 1406. Other sections of part XIV create civil liabilities for violations of the provisions against manipulation and
stabilization (section 1408), churning (section 1410), and fraudulent
proxy solicitations and tender requests (section 1412). Liabilities are
also created, without reference to part XIII, for false registration
statements, offering statements, and annual reports; 20 other false
filings; 27 and false distribution statements.28 In addition, section
1423(a) allows a court to "recognize a private action based on a
violation of a provision of this Code or a rule or order thereunder ...
even though it is not expressly created by part XIV." By creating
distinct liability sections with differing elements the Code avoids
the blunderbuss approach of the present law under rule lOb-5. 20
26. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973).
27. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1404 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973).
28. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1405 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). Section 509
of the first tentative draft, completed in March 1972, requires the filing of distribution
statements prior to certain secondary distributions.
29. The Code would also settle disputes among the circuits over the necessity of
scienter. See note 11 supra. First, it expressly defines knowledge: "When reference is
made to this section, a misrepresentation is known by a person to be a misreprcscnta•
tion if he (a) knows or believes that the matter is otherwise than represented, (b) docs
not have the confidence in its existence or nonexistence that he expresses or implies,
or (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies he has for liis
belief." ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 251A (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973).
Second, the Code makes clear the scienter requirement for each type of violation.
Under section 1402, which prohibits insider trading, negligence suffices for liability,
and the burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not negligent. Negligence is
also sufficient under section 1403, which creates liability for misrepresentations (defined
in section 259 to include material omissions) in registration statements, offering state•
ments, and annual reports. If the plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual knowl•
edge as defined in section 251A, however, the limitations on damages imposed by
section 1403(g)(2) do not apply. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 251A, Comment (4)
(Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). (Section 1403(g)(2) limits damages with respect to
each defendant to the greatest of $100,000, one per cent of the defendant's gross income
for the last fiscal year, or where the violation is based on the defendant's sale of stock,
his profit from later repurchasing the same type of securities at a lower price.) Section
1404, which deals with misrepresentations in filings other than those covered by sec•
tion 1403, requires proof that the defendant had knowledge. Negligence suffices under
section 1405 to establish liability for false distribution statements, but an underwriter
without section 251A knowledge is not liable for falsely certifying that he is unaware
of any further information that must be disclosed. Liability under section 1406 for
false publicity is also predicated on the existence of section 251A knowledge.
The Code would also end some of the confusion surrounding the definition of
materiality. See note 11 supra. Section 256(a) states: "A fact is 'material' if a reasonable
person would attach importance to it under the circumstances in determining his
course of action." Section 259(a) incorporates this concept into the definition of mis•
representation: " 'Misrepresentation' means (1) an untrue statement of a material fact,
or (2) an omission to state a material fact necessary to prevent the statements made

Notes
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Perhaps more valuable than the Code's orderly structure of rights
and remedies, however, are the methods it employs to limit the
plaintiff class in a rule l0b-5-type action. Present judicially developed limitations require privity, a showing that the plaintiff did not
merely retain his stock during the period of insider wrongdoing,
proof of reliance on the defendant's representations or nondisclosures, and the establishment of a causal connection between the
inadequate disclosure and the plaintiff's economic loss. The following
analysis compares the Code's limitations with those developed by the
courts.
I.

PRIVITY

Privity-generally defined as "[m]utual or successive relationship
to the same rights of property"30-was formerly a common requirement in actions based on fraud or misrepresentation.31 If strictly imposed it would allow a plaintiff to sue only the person from whom he
bought or to whom he sold.32 A rigid privity requirement thus cannot be insisted upon in cases involving stocks sold on an open
market.33
However, a fairly early case, Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,34 required that "[a] semblance of privity"35 be established between the defendant-vendor and the plaintiff. In that case
the court dismissed a rule lOb-5 suit in part because the insiders'
last sale of allegedly overvalued stock occurred weeks before the
plaintiffs purchased similar stock. Although the district court admitted that the defendants may have engaged in fraud, it held that
there was no fraud on these particular plaintiffs. It refused to rule on
the rights of investors who bought their stock during the period of
the defendants' sales,36 thereby implying that the required "semfrom being misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they were made."
A narrower definition of materiality applies in cases of silence (failure to disclose).
Section 1303, which deals with an insider's duty to disclose while trading, introduces
the term "fact of special significance," defined as a material fact that if disclosed would
"affect the market price of a security to a significant extent" or a fact to which "a
reasonable person would attach decisive importance • . . in determining his course of
action.''
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (4th ed. 1951).
31. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, § 8.5(110).
32. Id.
33. Securities exchange transactions are impersonal and not conducive to matching
particular investors. See Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 607, 644 (1964); Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule IOb-5 Duty To Disclose
Material Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev.
944, 958 n.79 (1967).
34. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afjd., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
35. 99 F. Supp. at 706.
36. 99 F. Supp. at 706.
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blance of privity" may exist if the plaintiff and the defendant buy and
sell at approximately the same time.
Most courts, however, have abandoned the privity requirement. 37
Plaintiffs even have been allowed to proceed against defendants who
engaged in no trading whatsoever. In Heit v. Weitzen,38 for example,
the court allowed recovery even though it was unlikely that the defendants-a corporation, several of its directors, and a vice-president
-had any concern with the price of the corporation's stock. Their
wrongdoing primarily involved overcharges on government contracts,
and they engaged in no trading of the securities of the corporation.
The stockholder-plaintiffs charged that the defendants had violated
rule I0b-5 by their failure to disclose that a substantial part of the
corporation's income for fiscal 1964 was derived from these overcharges and by their consequent misstatement of the corporation's
assets in press releases and an annual report. The Second Circuit
court of appeals held that a cause of action was stated under rule
lOb-5 where the deceptive device employed would cause reasonable
investors to trade in reliance thereon, whether or not the defendants
engaged in contemporaneous trading.39
Although a privity requirement has been largely abandoned,
courts still occasionally speak in "semblance of privity" terms. In In
re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation40 the court stated:
[N]o court has yet advocated an unconditional abandonment of
privity, and it is axiomatic that some legally cognizable relationship, perhaps akin to the "semblance of privity" concept espoused in
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp. . . . must be
present between the parties before liability may be imposed. . • .
[I]f this underlying concept of privity was totally disregarded, a
burden out of all proportion to the fault involved might be cast
upon anyone who makes false assertions in the marketplace.41
37. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace
Trust Co., [1973 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,206, at 94,880
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1973) ("While no court has yet completely abandoned a requirement
of some legally cognizable relationship between plaintiffs and defendants, • • • it is
nevertheless well established in this circuit that the traditional element of privity is not
a prerequisite to Rule IOb-5 liability"); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler &: Co., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 1J 94,133, at 94,542 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973)
("[P]rivity of contract does not seem to be required for the maintenance of a section
IO(b) cause of action, ••• indeed, it may have all but disappeared as a prerequisite"):
Freed v. Szabo Food Serv. Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH F.£JJ. SEc. L. REP,
~ 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa.
1964).
38. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
39. 402 F.2d at 913; accord, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
40. 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
41. 360 F. Supp. at 376-77.

June 1974]

Notes

1407

The Caesars Palace plaintiffs, purchasers of debentures of Caesar's
World Inc., were attempting to sue the shareholders, employees, officers, and partners of the corporation and partnership that sold the
Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino to Caesar's World. Caesar's World
and its officers were also defendants. The alleged violations involved
dissemination of false and misleading information about the Casino's
financial status and misstatements and omissions in the registration
statements and annual report of Caesar's World. The Caesars Palace
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as to them on several
grounds, including lack of privity. Despite the court's concern for a
"semblance of privity," it refused to dismiss the complaint, finding
that "an actionable relationship exist[ed] benveen the parties." 42 It
did, however, invite the defendants to resubmit the question if, pursuant to discovery, they were able to prove that "a total absence of
privity exist[ed]." 4 3
Caesars Palace, however, should not be construed as requiring
"privity" in the sense that recovery can be had only for those
tainted shares that are traced through the market from the defendants to the plaintiffs. The court may well have been troubled by the
broader problem that the plaintiffs' securities were not even issued
by the corporation in which the Caesars Palace defendants held an
interest. Thus, the "legally cognizable relationship" that the case
requires may be more in the nature of an insider-stockholder relationship than a purchaser-seller relationship.
The Federal Securities Code follows the current general practice
and does not impose a privity requirement. Professor Loss pointed
out that this is not without its disadvantages:
I know it's fashionable for law professors particularly to pooh-pooh
privity as a concept in deceit, and I have done it along with others,
but when you abandon the privity concept and make a director or
officer liable to everybody who has bought or sold in the market
because there is a false press release or a false report, or something of
that sort, the potential liability is really quite horrendous in relation to the crime, if it be a crime.
Again, I'm not suggesting that there should never be liability here.
I'm simply saying that, when you abandon a basic concept like
privity, you must think through the implications ....44
The Code's pol-icy of limiting excessive liability tempers the effect
of its abandonment of the privity requirement. In cases involving
false registration statements, offering statements, and reports (section
1403); other false filings (section 1404); false distribution statements
(section 1405); and false publicity (section 1406), the Code sets a
ceiling on damages for each defendant at the greatest of $100,000, one
42. 360 F. Supp. at 377.
43. 360 F. Supp. at 377.
44. Loss, supra note 10, at 35.
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per cent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of the defendant's gross income for the last fiscal year, or the defendant's profit from selling and
buying or buying and selling securities of the type in question.
Moreover, section 1402, which deals with deceptive sales and purchases, distinguishes between face-to-face and market transactions.
Section 1402(a) makes a defendant in a face-to-face transaction liable
to only his immediate buyer or seller. In contrast, section 1402(b)
provides that when the matching of buyer and seller is "substantially
fortuitous," a defendant is liable to all who buy or sell between the
day the defendant unlawfully buys or sells and the day when all
material facts become generally available. Although similar to a
"semblance of privity" requirement, section 1402(b) more accurately
deals with causation-of-loss, since persons not within its time provision would not have been injured by the defendant's actions. This
limitation on plaintiffs pinpoints those injured, rather than those
who bought or sold at approximately the same time as the defendant,
which was the concern of the Farnsworth Radio court.
While a privity requirement would eliminate many plaintiffs in
actions such as the Penn Central case, and thus protect some defendants from potentially disproportionate private damage judgments,
•its passing need not be mourned. It creates an arbitrary distinction in
the context of a national market on which the securities of large,
publicly held corporations are sold. An investor who trades on a
public securities exchange neither knows nor cares whether he purchased his particular shares from a corporate insider. 40 The privity
requirement would thus make compensation in rule IOb-5 cases
depend on a fortuitous event-whether or not a particular investor
engaged in securities trading during approximately the same time
period as an insider accused of wrongdoing.
II.

THE BIRNBAUM DoGTRINE

Although they have rejected the privity requirement, the courts
have sought to replace it with other theories of limitation. One of
these theories, the so-called Birnbaum doctrine, disqualifies plaintiffs
who merely retain securities during the period of the defendant's
nondisclosure or misrepresentation. This limitation differs from the
"semblance of privity" requirement in that the period of defendant's
wrongful representations, not the period of the defendant's trading,
marks the time in which the plaintiffs must buy or sell the securities
in question.
The Birnbaum requirement arose not from concepts of common
law privity but from the legislative history of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and the language of that section that pro45. Of course, an investor might care to know that he is buying while insiders arc
selling, or vice versa.
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hibits the use of manipulative and deceptive devices "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 46 Rule lOb-5 also applies
only to devices used "in connection with" a securities transaction.47
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.48 the Second Circuit announced that section lO(b) "was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs, and that rule X-lOb-5 extended protection only to
the defrauded purchaser or seller."49 Applying this interpretation,
the court dismissed a suit brought by minority shareholders charging
that the individual defendant had made misrepresentations "in connection with" the sale of his controlling interest in one of the defendant corporations. The sale was made for a substantial premium after
the defendant rejected a merger that would have been very profitable
to all of the corporation's shareholders, including the plaintiffs. The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant's sale of a
controlling interest met the requirements of rule lOb-5 and found
that the plaintiffs, who had retained their securities, were not "purchasers or sellers" within the meaning of the rule. 50
The Birnbam:n case thus derived two requirements from the "in
connection with" language of section IO(b) and rule lOb-5. The
first distinguishes defendants whose ·wrongdoing involves trading
from those charged with "mere mismanagement"; the second distinguishes plaintiffs who are purchasers and sellers from investors
who retain their stock through the period of wrongdoing. 51
The first requirement has a valid rationale. Common law concepts of fiduciary duty have traditionally covered corporate mismanagement,52 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to
protect the integrity of the trading market rather than to oversee internal corporate operations. 53 Ironically, however, it is this requirement that the courts may have diluted. 54 The Supreme Court, in
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The text of this section is set out in note 8 supra.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1974). The text of rule lOb-5 is set out in note 9 supra.
48. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
49. 193 F.2d at 464.
50. 193 F.2d at 463-64.
51. Analytically the two requirements are distinct, although in practice plaintiffs
are more likely to be purchasers or sellers in trading than in mismanagement cases.
The unsuccessful plaintiffs in Birnbaum subsequently recovered under state law on
the theory that the defendant had appropriated a corporate opportunity to his own
benefit. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (diversity jurisdiction).
52. w. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 264 (1968); Simmons v.
Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 {1971).
53. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. A prediction of the demise of Birnbaum should be ventured cautiously. It has
been made before and has been proved wrong. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era for Rule IOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
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Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life b Casualty Co.,r.r,
stretched the scope of section IO(b) to cover a situation that, although
peripherally involving a sale of securities, was more a case of corporate looting than of abuse of the securities market. The "misrepresentation" in question was that Manhattan, the corporate seller of
certain United States Treasury bonds, would receive the proceeds
from the sale. In fact the proceeds were used by an individual defendant to purchase Manhattan stock. 56 The Court found the scheme
to be "an 'act' or 'practice' within the meaning of Rule IOb-5 which
operated as a 'fraud or deceit' on Manhattan ..." 07 and held that the
plaintiff58 had stated a cause of action under section IO(b). 00
The Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit's view that section IO(b) is "limited to preserving the integrity of the securities
market.'' 60 All that is required for redress under section IO(b), it said,
is "a 'sale' of a security and ... fraud ... used 'in connection with'
it ... .'' 61 Manhattan was protected because it "suffered an injury as
a result of deceptive practices touching its sales of securities as an
investor," 62 the securities being the Treasury bonds. The Court's
language seemingly eliminates any requirement as to the defendant
other than that he engage in a fraud that in some manner can be connected with a purchase or sale of securities. The connection in
Bankers Life seems to have been tenuous indeed. Certainly there
55. 404 U.S. 6 (19'71).
56. One Begole paid for the stock with a check obtained from the Irving Trust
Company for which there were no funds on deposit. After Begole acquired the Man•
hattan stock, Manhattan sold its United States Treasury bonds for $4,854,552.67. The
proceeds from this sale, plus enough cash to bring the total to $5,000,000, were trans•
£erred to Manhattan's account at Irving Trust against which the Irving Trust check
was then charged. Irving Trust issued a second $5,000,000 check to Manhattan that
Manhattan's new president tendered to the Belgian-American Bank and Trust Com•
pany, which issued a $5,000,000 certificate of deposit in the name of Manhattan, The
certificate was assigned to the New England Note Corporation and was then endorsed
to the Belgian-American Banking Corporation as collateral for a $5,000,000 loan to
New England. The proceeds from this loan were used to cover the second Irving
Trust check for $5,000,000. The outcome was that Begole had used Manhattan assets
to purchase the Manhattan stock from Bankers Life. Manhattan's books reflected only
the sale of its government bonds and the purchase of the certificate of deposit. They
did not show that its assets had been used to purchase Manhattan's shares or as•
signed to New England and then pledged to Belgian-American. 404 U.S. at 7-9.
57. 404 U.S. at 9.
58. The Superintendent of Insurance sued on behalf of Manhattan but really
represented Manhattan's creditors. The Supreme Court approved this procedure on
the ground that controlling stockholders owe fiduciary obligations to their corpora•
tions for the benefit of its creditors as well as its minority shareholders. 404 U.S. at 12,
Manhattan Casualty Company had no minority shareholders. 404 U.S. at 7.
59. 404 U.S. at 13-14.
60. 404 U.S. at 12, quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &: Cas. Co., 430
F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970), revd., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
61. 404 U.S. at 12.
62. 404 U.S. at 12-13.
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were contrivances to hide the absence of the appropriated assets.
However, the purchases, transfers, and pledge63 merely concealed the
primary wrongdoing, which was not an abuse of the market process
but simple misappropriation. Although cases of purely internal
corporate mismanagement in which no defendant trades are not
brought within the reach of section IO(b), Bankers Life does seem to
reject Birnbaum insofar as certain breaches of fiduciary duty are
concemed.64 Plaintiffs ordinarily should have little trouble satisfying
the "touch test" of Bankers Life,65 but the "mere mismanagement"
limitation still may be viable in cases in which the alleged wrongdoing is completely divorced from any securities transaction.66
The proposed, Code adds little and settles nothing in the area of
the "mere mismanagement" distinction drawn by Birnbaum. The Introductory Memorandum points out that one of the principal problems with the present state of the law is that "[i]t has become increasingly difficult to draw the line between violation of Rule lOb-5
in stockholders' derivative actions and the traditional case of corporate mismanagement that merely happens to involve a securities
transaction." 67 Despite their realization of the problem, however, the
drafters intentionally chose to leave open "as simply not ripe for
codification . . . the delicate question of drawing a line between
securities fraud and corporate mismanagement ...." 68 Fearing that
any bright line would be too tight or too loose, they concluded that
"[t]he Golden Mean will have to be pricked out in the common-law
tradition." 69
Accordingly, section 1301(a) makes it unlawful to engage in a
deceptive act or misrepresentation "in connection with" a security
transaction, a proxy solicitation, or a tender request.70 By using the
63. See note 56 supra.
64. Cf. 404 U.S. at 12.
65. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy
v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,206, at 94,880-81 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
1973).
66. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Waltzer v. Billera,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,011 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1973);
Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 11 93,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
67. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum at xvii (Tent. Draft
No. 2, March 1973).
68. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum at xxi (Tent. Draft
No. 2, March 1973).
69. ALI FEDERAL 5ECURITD1S CODE§ 1423(a), Comment (6) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March
1973).
70. ALI FEDERAL SECURITlES CODE § 130l(a} (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973):
It is unlawful for any person to engage in a deceptive act or a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or
buy a security, or an inducement to liold a security, (2) a proxy solicitation or
other circularization of security holders in respect of a security of a registrant,
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"in connection with" language of section IO(b) and rule IOb-5, the
Code incorporates the present case law distinguishing securities cases
from mismanagement cases. In addition, section 22571 prevents
blanket inclusion of simple corporate mismanagement cases by defining "a deceptive act" as a fraudulent or deceptive "act, device,
scheme, practice, or course of conduct." However, "[t]he existence of
a deceptive act is not precluded by the fact that it constitutes company 'mismanagement." 72
The second limitation imposed by Birnbaum grants standing only
to plaintiffs who actually purchase or sell securities during the period
of wrongdoing, and it is less reasonable than the "mere mismanagement" distinction. It assumes that Congress intended to withhold
protection from investors induced to retain declining securities by an
abuse of the market process.
In reaching its conclusion, the Birnbaum court relied heavily on
the express intention of the Securities and Exchange Commission
in adopting rule IOb-5 "to close [a] ' ... loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud
in their purchase.' " 73
Far from closing a loophole, however, the Birnbaum standing
requirement carves out a limitation that serves no purpose other than
arbitrarily to narrow the plaintiff class in a given case. 74 It eliminates
plaintiffs who may well have suffered damage equal to or greater than
that suffered by those plaintiffs whose action it allows, for the decision
or (3) a tender request or a recommendation to security holders in favor of or
opposition to a tender request.
71. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIF.S CODE § 225 (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973):
(a) "Deceptive act" includes an act, device, scheme, practice, or course of conduct that (I) is fraudulent, (2) operates or would operate as a fraud, or (3) is
likely to deceive regardless of whether deception is intended.
(b) Inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or speak may be a deceptive act.
(c) The existence of a deceptive act is not precluded by the fact that it constitutes company mismanagement.
72. See § 225(c), cited at note 71 supra.
73. 193 F.2d at 463, quoting SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Fraudulent practices by sellers were directly pi:;oscribed by section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). The failure to mention fraudulent practices by buyers created
the "loophole" that rule IOb-5 closed. 193 F.2d at 463. In closing the loophole, how•
ever, the court made reference to the fact that section 17(a) "only made it unlawful
to defraud purchasers of securities." 193 F.2d at 463 (emphasis original). Its conclusion
that rule lOb-5 meant only to augment the earlier statute led it to adopt a similar
limitation.
74. This has been sufficient justification for the few who have put forth any rationale
for the standing rule. See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Kellogg,
The Inability To Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing To Sue Under Rule
I0b-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 93, 114-16 (1970). But unless some legal theory for
precluding suits by mere "holders" of securities is offered, one might just as reasonably
preclude suits by persons born on Tuesdays and Thursdays.
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not to sell stock is as potentially dangerous as the decision to buy it.
The protection afforded a given plaintiff should not depend on
whether he actually traded in securities but whether the defendant's
fraud affected his decision to trade or retain.75 Despite its illogic, the
Birnbaum standing rule has already been applied in a motion for
summary judgment against certain Penn Central investors who
neither purchased nor sold Penn Central securities during the
period of alleged wrongdoing. 76
Although the Supreme Court has never spoken on the Birnbaum
standing requirement, its statement in Bankers Life77 that "[s]ection
IO(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively" 78 has
been relied on by many courts in eroding the rule. In Bankers Life
the Court found the plaintiff79 to be a seller of securities, making it
unnecessary to review the validity of the purchaser-seller requirement. However, the case strained the requirement. The plaintiff was
a seller only because it was induced to convert an asset-bonds-into
a form-cash-that could be appropriated more easily.
Courts often assert the standing requirement to bar a suit that
could as easily have been dismissed for failure to complain of more
than an ordinary breach of fiduciary duty. 80 On the other hand, the
standing requirement has been circumvented by liberal interpretations and exceptions in cases that do not easily fit within it.
For example, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.81 the Second Circuit gave standing to a plaintiff whose corporation had been subjected to a short form merger,82 even though he had not yet sold his
75. See W. PAINTER, supra note 52, at 284.
76. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1333-36 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
modified, 357 F. Supp. 869 (1973), afjd., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that the exchange of shares pursuant to the 1969
reorganization of the railroad, see note 1 supra, was not a purchase or sale of securities:
Although the point is not raised on this appeal, several of the complaints do
allege insider selling by defendants which might be considered the "sale" in
connection with which fraud occurred. If these are relevant sales, however, we
do not see how plaintiffs could be considered to be "investors and •.. principals
in the [sales] transaction" which ••• [is] considered necessary for standing ..••
The plaintiffs in this case allege no relationship whatsoever with the insider sales
"in connection with" which fraud is alleged.
494 F.2d at 533 n.6.
77. Discussed in text accompanying notes 55-66 supra.
78. 404 U.S. at 12.
79. Technically the plaintiff was the Superintendent of Insurance suing on behall
of the creditors of the seller. See note 58 supra.
80. E.g., Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 999 (1971); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., [19701971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[ 92,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd. on other
grounds, 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
82. The relevant statutory short form merger allowed a corporation owning 95
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stock, because his only options were to accept the acquiring corpora•
tion's cash offer or to exercise his appraisal rights. Since the plaintiff
eventually would receive cash for his shares, the court felt that requiring him to sell as a condition to bringing suit would be a "needless
formality." 83 This "forced seller" doctrine has also covered plaintiffs
forced to sell because of antitrust lawss4 or the defendants' control of
the market for the stock.so
Courts have found "purchases" and "sales" in mergers,so exchanges of assets for stock in corporate reorganizations,87 liquidations,ss and the issuance of stock.so A "forced purchaser" rule has
evolved to cover plaintiffs, usually brokers, who buy securities after
the period of the wrongdoing because of the defendant's failure to
pay for them. 0° Courts have relaxed the standing requirement to
allow the maintenance of actions by "aborted purchasers or sellers"
who would have entered into a securities transaction had it not been
for the fraud of the defendant,91 and the requirement has been completely eliminated in suits seeking only injunctive relief.92
In view of the disinclination of courts to apply the Birnbaum
standing requirement it is surprising that it is still paid lip service.93
per cent of the shares of another corporation to merge into the other corporation
without the consent of the remaining shareholders. 374 F.2d at 633.
83. 374 F.2d at 634.
84. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert,
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
85. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
86. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Goldstein v. Regal
Crest, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
87. See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir,
1969).
88. See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 920 (1973).
89. See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
90. See, e.g., A.T. Brod &: Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Jeffries &: Co,
v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
91. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973) (as
modified on denial of rehearing and rehearing en bane). In Manor Drug Stores an
antitrust suit against a trading stamp company resulted in a consent decree requiring
divestiture by the shareholders of the company of 55 per cent of their interest. This was
to be accomplished by merging the company into a new company and offering stock
of the new company to those retail users of the stamps who were not shareholders in
the old company. The plaintiffs were dissuaded from accepting the offer by a mis•
leading prospectus, and the court ruled that they had standing because the consent
decree served as the equivalent of a contractual relationship, thus providing objective
evidence that the plaintiffs would have purchased had the transaction not been aborted
by the fraud of the defendants. 492 F.2d at 141-42.
·
92. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970);
Mutual Shares v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
93. Many circuits recently have rejected expressly or impliedly the opportunity to
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For example, in Heyman v. Heyman 94 the court, after making it clear
that the Birnbaum doctrine would still be followed, granted standing
to the beneficiary of a trust that was funded by a fraudulent sale. The
court acknowledged that the plaintiff "[did] not fit comfortably
within the rubric of 'seller,' " 95 but, since the plaintiff would be the
beneficiary of the sale of the stock, the court found that her connection with the sale was sufficiently intimate to bring her within the
Birnbaum rule.96 The holding in Interf!ational Control Corp. v.
Vesco91 that a stock dividend was a sale even though there was no
consideration98 prompted the dissenting judge to say "I fear that the
decision of the majority may portend the demise of the Birnbaum
rule." 99
Dissatisfaction with the Birnbaum doctrine in the Seventh Circuit
finally lead to its overt rejection. In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.10•0 the court observed: "Instead of stating the issue in
terms of standing, we think it more useful to ask whether the
plaintiffs were members of the class for whose special benefit Rule
lOb-5 was adopted." 101 Answering the charge that the rejection of
Birnbaum would create an unmanageable flood of litigation, the
court responded that the number of parties who can satisfy its
"special class"· test may not differ materially from the number who
qualify under the present flexible interpretation of the purchaserseller requirement.102 In any event, the court noted, the SEC could
overturn the purchaser-seller requirement. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S. April 22, 1974); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483
F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1973); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421,
425-26 (1st Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521 n.9 (8th Cir.
1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Drachman
v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, revd. on rehearing en bane, 453 F.2d 736, 738 (2~ Cir. 1971).
94. 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
95. 356 F. Supp. at 966.
96. 356 F. Supp. at 965.
97. 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974).
98. The distribution of the stock dividend was part of a scheme by which the
defendants transferred the assets of International Controls Corp. (ICC) to other corporations controlled by the defendants, in fraud of investors in ICC. In the dividend
transaction, ICC incorporated Fairfield General as a wholly owned subsidiary and
subsequently transferred stock that ICC held in Fairfield Aviation, also an ICC subsidiary, to Fairfield General in return for Fairfield General stock. This stock was
distributed to ICC shareholders as a dividend. The issuance was held _to be a sale.
490 F.2d at 1343-46.
99. 490 F.2d at 1359.
100. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.LW. 3595 (U.S. April 22, 1974).
101. 490 F.2d at 658. For lower court decisions rejecting Birnbaum see Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337
F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
'
102. 490 F.2d at 660.
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amend rule IOb-5 if it became unwieldy.103 The argument that
Birnbaum should be followed for the sake of preserving national
consistency was also rejected. The court was skeptical of the consistency of Birnbaum's following at the present time and felt that
only the Supreme Court could unify the law in the area. 104
The Code, surprisingly, does not resolve the purchaser-seller
dispute. Part XIII, however, does establish that inducement to hold
a security can be an unlawful act. Section 1301(a)(l) makes it unlawful to "engage in a deceptive act or misrepresentation in connection
with ... an inducement to hold a security,"106 and section 130l(b)
creates a duty to correct information that is later discovered to be a
misrepresentation if it induced a person to hold. Likewise, section
1303(a) prohibits an insider-trader from inducing an investor to hold
a security if he knows a fact of special significance100 that is not generally available. Also, section 1304(c) makes it unlawful to induce
the holding of securities by deceptive acts in connection with, or
misrepresentations in, a "press release or other form of publicity,"
and section 1304(d) creates a duty of correction.
Despite the clear intent of part XIII to cover antifraud violations
connected with the holding of securities, part XIV does not expressly
provide a private right of action for holders. Section 1402(a), which
deals with face-to-face transactions, makes a violator of section 130l(a)
(1) or 1303(a) liable only to "his buyer or seller." In cases involving
a market transaction, section 1402(b) provides that a defendant is
liable only "to a person who buys or sells" between the day when he
buys or sells and the day when all material facts become generally
available.107
At first blush the Code seems to codify the Birnbaum standing
requirement. Section 1423(a), however, gives courts the power to
recognize private actions for violations of Code provisions, even
though such actions are not expressly created by part XIV, as long as
any new action is not inconsistent with any conditions or restrictions
expressly created by the Code. 108 This section leaves the "outer
103. 490 F.2d at 661.
104. 490 F.2d at 661.
105. For the complete text of section 1301(a) see note 70 supra, The definition of
deceptive act includes "inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or speak," ALI
FEDERAL SECURITIES CoDE § 225(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973), and the definition
of misrepresentation includes "an omission to state a material fact," ALI FEDEML
SECURITIES CoDE § 259(a){2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973).
106. The "fact of special significance" formulation imposes a strict standard for
the materiality of the withheld information. See note 29 supra.
107. A private right of action is also given to buyers or sellers in the provisions for
liability for false registration statements, offering statements, and reports (section
1403(c)); false filings generally (section 1404(c)); false distribution statements (section
1405); and false publicity (section 1406(a)).
108. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1423(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973):
A court may recognize a private action based on a violation of a provision of
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frontiers" of rule IOb-5 to judicial development. Comment (5) to
section 1423(a) makes it clear that the drafters intended to allow
courts to transcend Birnbaum by specifically mentioning that
nothing in the Code is inconsistent with holding that purchaserseller status is unnecessary if only injunctive relief is sought, that a
corporation in a merger not yet consummated is a purchaser, or that
only the corporation need be a purchaser in a derivative suit. In
Comment (5)(b) the Code's intent is made even more explicit: "The
courts are free to grant standing to persons who have been affirmatively induced not to sell."
Section 1423 may give rise to troublesome questions of uniformity. Does the Code suggest that district courts have the discretion
to overrule the opinions of their courts of appeals on matters of
standing? It would be anomalous for a district court to reject the
Birnbaum doctrine after it had been expressly upheld by the court of
appeals of the circuit. It would seem equally anomalous for the circuits to refuse to follow the lead of the Supreme Court if it chose to
resolve the standing issue. Presumably, then, the Code simply contemplates judicial development similar to that occurring now: The
circuits would experiment among themselves, subject to the occasional intervention of the Supreme Court. In any event, section 1423
would make it more difficult to argue that the need for national consistency requires the application of Birnbaum, as was urged but rejected in Eason. 109
The Code also codifies some of the holdings that have expanded
the meaning of "sale."110 Section 293(£)(3) of Tentative Draft No. 1
includes within the definition of "sale" "the issuance of a security
pursuant to a merger, consolidation, recapitalization, or transfer of
assets for securities." Comment (2) to sections 1402(a)-(c) makes it
clear that "[a] short form merger involves a 'purchase' from the
minority," thus incorporating the holding of Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co. 111 In general, however, the B~rnbaum standing requirethis Code or a rule or order thereunder (other than a rule of a national securities
exchange or registered securities association or a rule under [Sec. Ex. Act § 15(b)
(10)]) even though it is not expressly created by part XIV, but only_ if (1) it j.~
not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions in any of the actions expressly
created, (2) the provision, rule, or order is intended to protect a clas~ of p_!!rsons
to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged, (3)_ the plaintiff
satisfies the court that under the circumstances the remedy sought and the
deterrent effect of recognizing the action would not be disproportionate to the
violation, and (4) in cases comparable to those dealt with in section 1402(f)(2)(B)
or 1403(g)(2), any section incorporating either of those sections by reference, or
section 1408(d) a comparable limit is imposed on the measure of damages.
109. See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
111. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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ment would be nearly as unsettled under the Code as it is under
present Iaw.112

III. RELIANCE
Establishment of a causal relationship between a rule I0b-5
violation and a plaintiff's investment decision requires proof of the
plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation, or, in a case
involving nondisclosure, proof of reliance on the belief that the
concealed events have not occurred. 113 Reliance thus provides a "but
for" causal link114 between the defendant's ·wrongdoing and the decision to engage in or refrain from the transaction connected with the
plaintiff's economic loss, although the loss itself may have been
caused by other factors.115 The test, as announced in List v. Fashion
Park, Inc.,11 6 is "whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to
act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him
the undisclosed fact." 117 As applied to the Penn Central litigation,
this test would allow only those shareholders able to prove individual
reliance on the defendant's misleading conduct to recover under rule
IOb-5.118 Each purchaser would have to prove that he would have
refrained from buying if he had known the truth. In addition, assuming that the Birnbaum standing requirement were discarded,110
112, There is one area in which the Code expressly e.xtends a private remedy to
nontraders. Under section 1408(e), a person who violates section 1308 (dealing with
unlawful manipulation of stock prices) or section 1309 (dealing with unlawful stabilization) "is liable to any person other than a buyer or seller of the security involved for
any loss caused by the violation." The comment to section 1408 says that the provision
is intended for the case "where an unsuccessful takeover bidder [proves] that the
defendants ••• thwarted its bid by manipulating the market."
113. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970);
Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 267 (1st Cir. 1966); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F,2d
781, 785-86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955).
114. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1-167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970).
115. See text accompanying note; 145-53 infra.
116. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
117. 340 F.2d at 463.
.
118. Judge Lord reserved judgment as to whether proof of reliance will be required
in the Penn Central case. He permitted the suits to continue as a class action, Proof
of individual reliance was to be postponed until after the court had dealt with the
elements amenable to proof in a class action. 347 F. Supp. at 1344-45.
119. There is some indication that, where nontrading shareholders can offer the
proof of reliance described above, courts may be willing to discard the strict standing
requirement of Birnbaum in favor of a causation-of-investment-decision approacl1 in
damage as well as injunction cases. In Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. ,r 92,591 (N.D. III. 1969), the court held that a
cause of action was stated under rule lOb-5 by nontrading shareholders of a corporate
defendant that allegedly had made misrepresentations with the knowledge and ap•
proval of certain individual defendants. The representations were calculated to en•
courage the plaintiff-shareholders to refuse an advantageous tender offer, thereby allow-
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each holder of Penn Central stock would have to prove that he would
have closed out his holdings if he had known the truth.
The Supreme Court, however, may have modified the proof
standard under the reliance requirement in a way that could expand
the class of potential plaintiffs in a given suit. In Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States120 the Court rejected the necessity of proof
of individual reliance. It held instead that "[a]ll that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of
[his] decision [to sell]."121 The facts of the case, however, must be
examined. They may be so unique that more conventional rule
IOb-5 actions, such as the Penn Central litigation, must be distinguished.122
The plaintiffs in Affiliated Ute Citizens were individual mixedblood Ute Indians who had sold to non-Indians their shares in the
Ute Development Corporation (UDC), a corporation formed to distribute to mixed-bloods their share of tribal assets, including gas, oil,
and mineral rights and unadjudicated and unliquidated claims
against the United States. Each shareholder's right to dispose of his
stock was subject to first-refusal rights possessed by all members of the
tribe. UDC appointed the First Security Bank of Utah as its transfer
agent to hold the UDC stock for the shareholders and to issue
dividends to them. UDC's attorney specifically instructed the bank
to discourage the sale of stock by any shareholders.123 In adjudicating
a rule IOb-5 claim against employees of the bank, the district court
found that the defendants purchased and encouraged the sale of UDC
ing the individual defendants to take full advantage of the offer themselves. Although
the plaintiffs had allegedly suffered a loss when the market price of the stock dropped
upon the termination of the offer, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claim
should be dismissed because they had not actually purchased or sold, but had merely
failed to sell. The court agreed with the defendants that allowing a nontrading shareholder to maintain a private damage suit might in many cases permit such a shareholder
to file a claim for damages that resulted from "his own decision not to accept the offer
rather than any misdeeds of the defendants." [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. ,i 92,591, at 98,703. However, the court noted that this danger could be
avoided by requiring the plaintiff to prove that his reliance on the alleged misrepresentation caused him to refuse to tender. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. ,I 92,591, at 98,703. When the plaintiffs in Neuman discovered the misrepresentations they made telegraphic tenders, which were unacceptable to the offeree. The
court indicated that the plaintiffs' actions evidenced their intent to sell but for the
misrepresentations. This result is eminently fair; the alleged misrepresentations in
Neuman were designed to cause retention, and only nontrading shareholders could
have been injured.
120. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
121. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
122. See Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 124 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973). In Cohen the court declined to hold that it was error for the trial
court not to have given jury instructions according to the Ute formulation.
123. 406 U.S. at 145-46.
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shares without disclosing that they were creating a secondary market
for UDC shares among non-Indians and that the price of the stock in
the secondary market was higher than that received by the Indians.
The employees purchased shares for themselves and received commissions and gratuities, as well as increased deposits, in return for
their facilitation of sales to non-Indians. 124 The court found that the
defendants had violated rule lOb-5.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs on
the ground that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had relied
on the representations of the bank's employees.126 The Supreme
Court, however, accepted the trial court's view. By simply requiring
"that the facts withheld be material"126 the Court in essence submerged the reliance requirement into the definition of materiality.
The concealment of a fact is apparently deemed to be the cause of a
plaintiff's investment decision if the fact is material in that its disclosure could have been expected to influence the decision of a reasonable investor.
One-distinguishing feature of Affiliated Ute Citizens, however, is
that it involved nondisclosures. Proof of individual reliance is perhaps still necessary in misrepresentation cases. At first glance this is
anomalous. One would not wish to give defendants who make affirmative misrepresentations an easier time in court than those who simply
remain silent. However, since it is generally more difficult to prove
reliance in a nondisclosure case the actual advantage to the defendant
who makes affirmative misrepresentations is at best slight. Nevertheless, one case holds that Affiliated Ute Citizens "applies equally to
actual misrepresentations,"127 although most courts have applied it
only to nondisclosures.128
Another distinguishing feature of Affiliated Ute Citizens is that
it was not a class action. Potential recovery was limited, perhaps
making it feasible to weaken the reliance requirement. On the other
hand, insisting on proof of personal reliance in large class actions may
make the class action device unworkable. This concern has led at
least one court to loosen the reliance requirement in such a case.
When the defendants in In re Memorex Security Cases129 estimated
124. 406 U.S. at 146-47.
125. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970), revd. sub nom.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
126. 406 U.S. at 153. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
127. Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396, 401 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 270-71. Compare Gordon v. Durr,
366 F. Supp. 156, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973): "Affiliated Ute Citizens thus appears to leave
open the question of the existence of a reliance requirement where the gravamen of
the offense is misrepresentation rather than nondisclosure."
128. See cases cited in note 134 infra.
129. 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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that the trial would take sixty years to complete if they were given
the right to depose and cross-examine each of the 60,000 class members,130 the court concluded that in deciding the reliance question it
was also "deciding the larger question of whether Rule 23(b)(3) is
available in an action alleging securities fraud in the stock exchange
context." 131 The court adopted a "causal nexus" test for reliance,
stating:
If it is demonstrated that the Memorex. documents materially misrepresented the financial status of the corporation and that the
market responded thereto in a manner that the stock can be said to
have been "inflated," and that it was reasonable for an investor to
rely thereon, then a sufficient showing of a causal connection between
the misrepresentations and the purchases by class members will have
been made.182

The general view seems to be that the requirement that reliance
be proved, even if still insisted upon, ·will not defeat a class action,
although separate trials perhaps may be necessary at some point.133
The third distinguishing feature of Affiliated Ute Citizens is
that the misrepresentations were made directly to the plaintiffs. In
face-to-face situations relaxation of the reliance requirement may be
unobjectionable. It is clear that the plaintiffs would have known
the true facts if they had been revealed, and one can reasonably assume that the plaintiffs then would have insisted on the higher return available in the secondary market. The Penn Central situation
presents a different case. Not all investors in the open market are
aware of or comprehend the importance of a given disclosure; some
investors are more alert to financial news and better able to analyze
factual material than others. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that
a failure to disclose material information would be the cause-in-fact
of a decision to sell, purchase, or retain made by an uninformed or
unsophisticated investor.
Most courts, however, appear unwilling to limit Affiliated Ute
Citizens to the face-to-face situation.134 Indeed, one case has expressly
130. 61 F.R.D. at 97 n.7.
131. 61 F.R.D. at 98.
132. 61 F.R.D. at 101. See also Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
133, See, e.g., Brandt v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP.~ 94,138, at 94,585 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1973); Entin v. Barg, 60 F.R.D. 108, 112-13
(E.D. Pa. 1973). See also note 118 supra. But see Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED, SEc. L. REP. ~ 94,030 (S.D. Fla. March 13, 1973), in
which positive misstatements were alleged and the question of reliance was considered
"a highly individual question," CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 94,030, at 94,144, that contributed to the denial of class action status.
134. E.g., Sirota v. Econo-Car Intl., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jenkins
v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler
&: Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ~ 94,133, at 94,542
(C.D.
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rejected the argument that Affiliated Ute Citizens is distinguishable
from a case involving transactions on the open market, holding that
application of the Affiliated Ute Citizens causation rule "is dependent not upon the character of the transaction-face-to-face versus
national securities exchange-but rather upon whether the defendant
is obligated to disclose the inside information."136 Although limiting
the relaxation of the reliance requirement to face-to-face transactions
would protect defendants from exorbitant liability, the courts seem
unwilling to draw this line.
If the courts abandon proof of reliance as an element of the
plaintiffs case, a question remains whether the defendant can assume
the burden and prove that the plaintiff did not actually rely on the
misrepresentation. The holding of the Second Circuit in Chris-Graft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.136 that proof of materiality
raises a "presumption" that the plaintiff relied on the deception137
imposes on a defendant the burden of proving that the plaintiff
would not have learned of the material facts or appreciated their
significance even if disclosure had been made. 138 This interpretation
has gained acceptance in the Third139 and Fifth Circuits.140
The proposed Federal Securities Code continues the trend away
from a reliance requirement, insisting instead upon proof of causation of loss (legal cause). The emphasis is not on the causal connection between the fraudulent deception and the plaintiff's investment
decision. Instead, the Code emphasizes the causal link between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs loss. Professor Loss explains
the difference:
A buyer can have relied on a seller's misstatement of a material fact
in deciding to buy; but, if the general market drops precipitately
the next day on news of a political assassination or an invasion in
some part of the world, the buyer's loss is caused not by the misstateCal. Sept. 4, 1973). But cf. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 124 n,12 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), holding that failure to give jury instructions
according to the Ute formulation is not error.
135. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Smith, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 94,473, at 95,644. See also Reeder v. Mastercraft Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), holding that "[dJemonstrating
reliance in open market situations ••• should not be necessary."
136. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
137. 480 F.2d at 373-75. It should be noted that Chris-Craft arose under section 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
138. Judge Gurfein argued in his partial concurrence that the rationale behind the
reduced reliance standard was the elimination of the impractical task of discovering
"how many votes or decisions to tender were affected." In his view materiality implies
reliance as a matter of law, rather than merely raising a presumption. 480 F.2d at 400.
139. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (1974).
140. Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884 (1978),

June 1974]

Notes

1423

ment (except in the "but for" or post hoc propter hoc sense) but by
the disastrous political news.141

Proof of inducement of an investment decision thus has no general significance as a separate element in antifraud actions under the
Code. One exception is found in section 1403(d)(l), which disallows
the defense of correction to a defendant guilty of filing a false
registration statement, offering statement, or annual report if the
plaintiff "justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission." 142
Comment (8)(b) to section 1403 indicates that the List definition of
reliance is intended.143 The Affiliated Ute Citizens formulation-that
materiality proves reliance-would make section 1403(d)(l) surplusage, because materiality is already required for a section 1403
violation. Section 1404(d), which deals ·with other false filings, also
requires proof of reliance.
A reliance requirement of sorts also appears in section 256(b),
which elaborates on the definition of materiality in the face-to-face
situation: "When a person is communicating ·with a small number of
other persons, ... (2) a fact is not 'material,' notwithstanding section
256(a), with regard to a recipient of the communication who is
known by the maker of the communication not to regard or to be
likely to regard the fact as important in determining his course of
action although a reasonable investor would so regard it." This is
similar to a reliance requirement because it focuses on the causal
link between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's investment
decision. Whereas Affiliated Ute Citizens found reliance from materiality, however, the Code equates nonreliance with nonmateriality
in face-to-face situations. Ironically, under present law reliance may
be less significant in face-to-face situations than in market transactions, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute
Citizens.144

IV. CAusATION OF Loss
"Reliance" establishes a causal connection benV"een the deception
and the plaintiff's investment decision. Another causal connectionben\Teen the actions of the defendant that induced the investment
141. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 215A, Comment (4)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
March 1973) (emphasis original).
142. At present such situations arise under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
143. Section 1403(d)(2) states: "Reliance on an omission is proved by proof of reliance on the particular filing or document and ignorance of the omission; but reliance
on either a misrepresentation or an omission may be proved without proof that the
plaintiff read a particular filing or document." The Comment observes: "If reliance is
to be required at all ••• the text langnage, which comes from List, seems sound."
144. See text following note 133 supra.
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decision and the plaintiff's loss-may be required by section 28(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides that "no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under [the Act] ... shall
recover ... a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account
of the act complained of."145 Section 28(a) bars recovery by plaintiffs
who would not have avoided economic loss even if the defendants had
been completely candid.
Such a causation requirement is well conceived; it approximates
the results achieved by the Birnbaum standing rule without incorporating the latter's weaknesses. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco 140
illustrates the effect of the causation requirement. A corporation's
minority shareholders charged that the controlling shareholders had
manipulated the market price of the corporation's stock by reducing
dividends in order to acquire shares at a depressed price. The Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for injunctive
relief under rule IOb-5, even though they did not satisfy the Birnbaum standing requirement because they had purchased their stock
before the defendant's ·wrongdoing and had not yet sold it at the time
of the suit. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's damages
claims, however, because "[o]n this aspect of the case, the only transactions in securities that plaintiffs could refer to would be defendants'
purchases of stock from other ... shareholders at depressed prices;
. . . the causal connection between these and any alleged existing
damage to plaintiffs is slim indeed." 147 The court observed that while
the claim for damages was deficient with regard to "proof of loss and
the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; ... the
claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these issues .... " 148
This observation is important. In Genesco the market price of
the plaintiffs' stock presumably rose to its original level once the deception was exposed, so that the stockholders who retained their stock
suffered no actual damage. Only those who already sold their stock
at artificially depressed prices could prove permanent damage. Injunctive relief, however, was properly granted. Stockholders who retain their shares certainly have an interest in preventing future
manipulations.149
The effect of the causation requirement in Genesco was to bar
from recovery those plaintiffs who merely retained their shares, the
same result that would have been obtained under Birnbaum. Under
the Birnbaum rule, however, defrauded investors who retain de145. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
146. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); accord, Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436-37
(6th Cir. 1969). See also Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971).
147. 384 F.2d at 546.
148. 384 F..2d at 547.
149. 384 F.2d at 547.

June 1974]

Notes

1425

valued securities up to the time of suit are denied standing,150 but
those who sell their securities upon discovering the fraud can sue,1 51
even though the investment loss in both cases is caused by a decision
to retain stock in reliance on a misrepresentation. Thus, Birnbaum
makes a distinction between two investors who suffer an identical
drop in the value of their stock as its price hits bottom.
Since an investor may be injured as much by a decision to retain
securities as by a decision to sell or purchase, the requirement that
plaintiffs sell at some time before bringing suit is unreasonable.
One may, however, in some circumstances make a valid distinction between purchasers or sellers and mere holders of stock by
focusing on the causal connection between the fraudulently induced
investment decision and the plaintiff's damages. Purchasers and
sellers are more likely to be able to prove causation. For example, if
an insider is to trade without violating rule IOb-5 he must disclose
all material facts and allow time for their assimilation by the public.162 If he discloses discouraging information, the market price of
the securities involved will drop, indirectly communicating the information to even the least alert members of the investing public.
N onshareholders would refrain from purchasing or would purchase
at prices reflecting the stock's true value. "But for" the withholding
of material information, purchasers injured by a nondisclosure would
not have purchased, or at least would have paid a fair price, and
would have sustained no economic loss.
Mere "holders," who purchased their stock before occurrence of
the concealed events, occupy a different position. Many would have
suffered at least some loss even if the· insider had made a complete
and immediate disclosure, for the price of their shares would have
fallen as soon as the adverse information was released, and most
sales would thus be made at depressed prices.
If a shareholder planned to sell while he and most other shareholders were ignorant of facts that foretold a decline in the market
value of the stock, but he is dissuaded from selling because an insider makes affirmative misrepresentations, a causal connection would
exist both between the misrepresentation and the decision not to
sell and between the retention of the stock and the economic loss.
Accordingly, a requirement that a plaintiff who merely held stock
demonstrate that but for the misrepresentation he would have sold
while other investors held might seem appropriate.153
150. Morrow v. Schapiro, 334 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
_
151. Feldbcrg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1972); Silverman v. Bear,
Stearns &: Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Stockwell v. Reynolds &: Co., 252 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
152. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
153. Stockwell v. Reynolds &: Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), may have been
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Although this rule might work where the misrepresentation
occurs in a face-to-face ~ituation, it would present insurmountable
proof problems where the misrepresentations are directed to the
general public. In a case like Penn Central, the complete concealwent of the company's weakened financial condition equalizes the
market awareness of outside shareholders; sophisticated analysts are
as ignorant as na'ive investors. The former might justly claim that
they could have saved themselves if the facts had been revealed as
soon as they became known to the insiders. But it seems impossible
after the fact to separate those who might have saved themselves from
their less alert brethren. Therefore the proof problem described
above remains: If the truth were made known to the public the price
would drop whether the disclosure was made sooner or later, and all
holders would suffer loss. Because mere holders cannot sustain the
burden of proof with regard to causation, they should be denied
recovery under rule IOb-5.
It may appear that this approach merely reinstates the Birnbaum
standing requirement criticized at length above.164 However, an
analysis based on causation limits the plaintiff class in a way that is
both more analytically precise and more flexible, allowing for recovery in cases in which misrepresentations are personally addressed
to a few investors who can prove that they might have traded while
others held.
The Federal Securities Code adopts a different approach. It begins by defining causation in section 215A: "A loss is 'caused' by
specified conduct to the extent that the conduct (a) was a substantial
factor in producing the loss and (b) might reasonably have been
expected to result in loss of the kind suffered." "But for" causation
does not suffice under this definition. The comments give the example of a market decline after the published rectification of a false
earnings statement that was used in the sale of an electronics stock.
A buyer of the stock may satisfy clause (a) ("but for" causation defined in "substantial factor" terms) but would not satisfy clause (b)
("legal cause") to the extent that the market slide resulted from an
unconnected event, such as "the sudden death of the corporation's
president or a softening of the market in all electronics stocks."16 G
Part XIV of the Code defines the situations in which causation is
relevant to civil liability. The causation requirement for section
1402(b), which creates liability for market transactions violating
such a case. The court refused to dismiss the claims of investors who alleged that
they were dissuaded from selling stock by their broker's misrepresentations as to the
issuer's financial health.
154. See text following note 72 supra.
155. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CoDE § 215A, Comment (4)(b) (Tent, Draft No, 2,
March 1973).
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sections 1301(a)(l)156 or 1303(a),157 is found in section 1402(£)(2).
That section imposes the burden of proving lack of causation on the
defendant: "For purposes of section 1402(b), the measure of damages
... is (A) reduced to the extent (which may be complete) that the
defendant proves that the violation did not cause the loss." 158 The
comments label this concept "comparative causation."159 If the insiders cannot disprove causation, the measure of damages will be that
prescribed by section 1402(£)(1).16°For a buyer of Penn Central stock,
for instance, damages would be the difference between the purchase
price and the value of the securities at the time all of the previously
undisclosed facts became available.
Section 1402(£)(2)(B) mitigates the potential harshness of the
shift in the causation burden by placing a ceiling on liability. By
limiting damages "to the extent of the securities that the defendant
sold or bought" the provision protects insider-traders from civil
156. Section 130l(a)(l) is set out in note 70 supra.
157. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1303(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973):
It is unlawful for an insider to sell, buy, or induce the holding of a security
of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer
or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider believes, and
has reasonable ground to believe, that the fact is generally available or (2), if the
buyer, seller, or holder (or his agent in the transaction) is identified, (A) the insider believes, and has reasonable ground to believe, that that person knows it, or
(B) that person in fact knows it from the insider or otherwise.
158. Lack of causation is also a defense or a mitigating factor in § 1403(g)(l)(A)
(false registration statements, etc.), § 1404(e) (false filings generally), § 1405 (false publicity), and § 1408(c)(l) (manipulation and stabilization).
159. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1402(f)(2), Comment (1) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
March 1973).
160. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CoDE § 1402(f)(l) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973):
The measure of damages (subject to the limitations in paragraph (2)) is
(A), if the plaintiff is a buyer, the difference between the amount that he paid
and the value of the security determined as of the time specified in section
1402(e)(l) [the time all material facts became generally available], except that
(i), to the extent that the plaintiff sold a security of the class and series after
his purchase and before the time specified in section 1402(e}(l) realizing less than
he paid, "measure of damages" means the difference between the amount that
he paid and the amount that he received on sale, and
(ii), to the extent that the defendant bought a security of the class and series
after his sale on which the action is based and before the time specified in section 1402(e)(l) at a profit (compared with his sale price to the plaintiff) greater
than the measure of damages as defined in the foregoing portion of this subparagraph (A), "measure of damages" means that profit; and
(B), if the plaintiff is a seller, the difference between the amount that he received and the value of the security, determined as of the time specified in section
1402(e)(l}, except that
(i), to the extent that the plaintiff bought a security of the class and series
after his sale and before the time specified in section 1402(e)(l), paying more
than he received, "measure of damages" means the difference between the amount
that he paid on purchase and the amount that he received, and
(ii), to the extent that the defendant sold a security of the class and series
after his purchase on which the action is based and before the time specified in
section 1402(e)(l) at a profit (compared with his purchase price from the plaintiff)
greater than the measure of damages as defined in the foregoing portion of this
subparagraph (B), "measure of damages" means that profit.
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liabilities grossly out of proportion to their gain.161 Thus a Penn
Central insider who sold 1,000 shares immediately before the market
dropped 80 points would be liable at most for $80,000 (1,000 shares
X $80 per share).162
As discussed above,163 however, section 1402 expressly creates a
right of action only in buyers and sellers. Mere holders of securities
must depend on a judicially created action under section 1423(a).164
If a court does use section 1423(a), a question may arise whether the
shift in burden of proof and the damage limitations of section 1402
apply. Since the new action would still be based on violation of the
insider trading restrictions of section 1303(a), arguably the damage
and causation rules of section 1402 are grafted onto the new action.
This would be true at least with respect to the damage ceiling.
Clause (4) of section 1423(a) allows a new action only if "in cases
comparable to those dealt with in section 1402(f)(2)(B) ... a comparable limit is imposed on the measure of damages." Whether a
court may shift the burden of proving causation back to the plaintiffs
to compensate for extending standing to mere holders, however, is
less clear. Section 1423(a) provides that a new action may be recognized only if "the plaintiff satisfies the court that under the circumstances the remedy sought and the deterrent effect of recognizing the
action would not be disproportionate to the violation." This clause
supports the view that the court can adjust the elements of the action.
It expresses a concern that the remedy be commensurate with the
violation, and the court may feel that the remedy would be disproportionate unless the burden of proving causation is on the plaintiff.
Section 1423(a) allows recognition of a new action only "if it is
not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions in any of the
actions expressly created." A plaintiff may thus argue that the burden
of causation must be left with the defendant, as required by section
1402(f)(2)(A). However, the effect of section 1423(a) would be very
limited by so narrow a construction of "inconsistent." The better
interpretation is simply that a court may not, on the pretense of
recognizing a new action, refuse to enforce restrictions expressly
created by the Code. Thus, the example of an inconsistent action
given in the commentsrn5 is one that allows a market buyer to recover
for negligently false reports or press releases even though sections
161. Such protection is not afforded under present law. See text accompanying notes
16-18 supra.
162. Defendants are also protected by the artificial ceiling on damages discussed at
text following note 44 supra.
163. See text preceding note 107 supra.
164. Section 1423(a) is set out in note 108 supra.
165. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1423(a), Comment (4)(a) (Tent, Draft No. 2,
March 1973).
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1404 and 1406 require scienter in such cases. Such an action would
be little more than the nullification of a statutory provision.166
V. CONCLUSION
Although under present law the causation of loss requirement
may distinguish rationally among plaintiffs, the potential scope of
the plaintiff class when a large, publicly held corporation is involved
would still be vast, especially if Affiliated Ute Citizens is followed
literally. This may indicate that a private compensatory remedy is an
unworkable sanction for violations of rule IOb-5.
Moreover, private compensatory remedies do not further the
goals of section l0(b) and rule l0b-5. Both are essentially prohibitory
and designed to maintain an atmosphere of fair dealing in the securities marketplace. They do not demand disclosure of material facts
when concealment serves a corporate purpose; rather, they demand
that those who conceal confidential corporate information refrain
from trading.167 It is the insider's concealment, however, and not
his trading that causes the losses suffered by other investors.168 The
insider's trading on the basis of confidential information causes
damage only to those with whom he is directly in privity, and that
relationship is purely fortuitous. The defendant's real offense is his
abuse of the market. By using private information for personal gain
·wrongdoers decrease public confidence in the securities market and
discourage potential investors.169
In short, the primary thrust of rule IOb-5 should be the deterrence of insider misconduct, rather than compensation of investors.
A variety of noncompensatory sanctions exist through which deterrence can be achieved, including SEC investigations and criminal
sanctions.170 Perhaps the best solution is to deprive wrongdoers of
166. Similar problems may arise if section 1423(a) is used to create a private action
for plaintiffs induced to hold their securities by the defendant's misrepresentations in
a face-to-face transaction. Section 1402(a), which creates a remedy for purchasers and
sellers who are misled in nonmarket transactions, does not contain a damage ceiling
and does not shift the burden of proof of causation to the defendant. Whether a court
could impose a ceiling or shift the burden under section 1423(a) is unclear.
167. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
168. Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule lOb-5 Duty To Disclose Material
Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. REv. 944, 960
(1967).
169. The Penn Central case lends no support to Professor Manne's much-discussed
suggestion that insiders be permitted to trade on the basis of confidential information
as a reward for entreprenurial services. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING /\ND THE STOCK
MARKET 138-41, 147-89 (1966). Insider trading in the Penn Central context would reward
not the innovative but the inept who presided over the collapse of the enterprise.
170. See note 15 supra.
This does not mean that private investors must be left at the mercy of insiders.
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their unjust enrichment through either an SEC restitutionary action171 or a simple private derivative suit.172 Criminal sanctions173
and punitive damages174 could be imposed in egregious cases, ensuring that the insider will always be left with something to lose by attempting fraud. These options would provide a flexibility not now
available in compensatory damage cases.
The proposed Federal Securities Code does not limit the possibility of vast insider liability by narrowing the plaintiff class. Instead,
it places a ceiling on the damages each defendant must pay. Such a
scheme is itself an indication that full compensation of investors
injured in open market situations is unfeasible and of secondary
importance; the recoveries of individual plaintiffs are likely to be
insignificant.
·
Damage and restitutionary remedies are available when a plaintiff can prove that he was
the victim of a common law fraud in his dealings with a corporate insider. The plaintiff,
however, must show that he was damaged by his justifiable reliance on a material
misrepresentation made with intent to deceive by one who knew of the falsity. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105, 107-08 (4th ed. 1971). He may not
have a cause of action if he relied on nondisclosure rather than affirmative misrepre•
sentation. See note 12 supra. But see W. PROSSER, supra, § 106, at 996-99.
A rescission action grounded in federal law is also a possibility. The Securities Exchange Act expressly provides in section 29(b) that contracts made in violation of the
Act or any rule of the Commission thereunder shall be void as regards the rights of
any violator or of persons who acquired rights under the contract knowing of the facts
resulting in the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). (Section 1423(b) of the Code is
to the same effect.) Section 29(b) contemplates rescission of the contract and restitution
of the injured party's consideration. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (alternative holding); Geismar v. :Bond &: Goodwin, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Kardon and Geismar involved suits by defrauded sellers.
The voidability provision would seem by definition to apply only when privity of
contract exists between the litigants. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1759 (2d ed, 1961),
This, coupled with a short statute of limitations (suit must be brought within one
year after discovery that the violation was involved in the sale and within three years
of the violation), may make the section less attractive to plaintiffs than the implied
private remedy under rule lOb-5.
Rescission has also been granted under the general equitable powers of courts under
section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970). See Deckert v. In•
dependence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1940) (suit by a buyer induced to pur•
chase by violation of the 1933 Act). Such a remedy may avoid the statute of limitations
problem, but privity of contract probably would still be required.
171. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
172. In Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.l?d 78
(1969), the state court sustained the sufficiency of a derivative suit complaint that
sought to recover profits made by insiders trading on the basis of confidential cor•
porate information. The corporate officers allegedly sold their personal holdings without disclosing an approaching drastic reduction in the company's earnings. The court
saw no merit in the argument that the corporation could not complain because it had
suffered no direct damage. 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
See also Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W. 4603 (U.S.
April 29, 1974).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970). See note 15 supra.
174. See Note, Securities Regulations-Damages-The Possibility of Punitive Dam•
ages as a Remedy for a Violation of Rule J0b-5, 68 Mica. L. REV, 1608 (1970).
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Moreover, individual plaintiffs may be bypassed completely. Section 1409 sets up a proration mechanism to consolidate actions
against the same defendant and to spread the damages over the entire
plaintiff class. If the trial court does not feel that "the expense of
making the proration is warranted in relation to the amounts that
would be awarded to individual plaintiffs," section 1409(j) allows the
recovery to be turned over to the issuer (if it is not a defendant), provided that the action is not for a false filing or statement and an
award to the issuer would not be inequitable. Alternatively the recovery may be awarded to the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.175
The theory of the scheme "is compensation if practicable but in
any event deterrence and avoidance of unjust enrichment." 178 The
integrated and consistent civil liability proposals of Tentative Draft
No. 2 of the Federal Securities Code deserve serious consideration
as a method of rectifying the inequities and unrealities of present
rule lOb-5 actions. Unless similar limitations on liability are enacted, private federal damage remedies should be discontinued.

175. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a nonprofit corporation established by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll
(1970) (see especially 15 U.S.C. § 7ccc (1970)), to administer a fund for the protection
of customers of securities brokers and dealers on the national exchanges who are in
financial difficulty. The fund, established by 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (1970), is comprised in
part by contributions from brokerage houses and dealerships.
176. ALI FEDERAL SEcURITES CODE § 1409, Comment (5)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
March 1973).

